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functions. As Moore (1984) points out, their results are inadequate for the general study of optimal auctions. Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 apply to general probability spaces and arbitrary measurable functions. These propositions are proved by giving a simple geometric description of the set of all (implementable) reduced forms. A drawback of this approach is that it is not constructive. That is, we know which functions are reduced forms, but not which auctions generate them. When the set of types is finite, however, this geometric description suggests a convenient computational technique (linear programming) for recovering the auction underlying a reduced form. This technique can be used to construct approximate implementations when the set of types is infinite.
The next section presents the notation necessary to make the results precise. The following section states the propositions characterizing reduced forms. It is followed by an example to illustrate the results. The fifth section provides the proofs and the final section provides the linear program for approximating the underlying auction.
NOTATION AND BASIC DEFINITIONS
There is a measurable space (T, 97) of possible types of bidders, and the population of N bidders is independently and identically distributed according to the probability measure A on T. We will denote a generic element of T by t, and a generic element of TN by p (for profile). To avoid some uninteresting cases, we explicitly make the following assumption. The ith component, qi(t1,.. ., tN), is the probability that bidder i wins when each bidder j is of the type tj. Inequality (2.1) simply says that the probability that someone wins is less than or equal to 1. It may well be strict, for instance if the seller sets a minimum bid. Maskin and Riley (1984) When the auction q is symmetric, Q'(t) is independent of i for all t E T. In this case, dropping the superscript i from Q, we say that Q is the reduced form of q and that q implements Q. Thus, call Q implementable if there is some symmetric auction q which satisfies (2.3) for each ti E T. Call the reduced form of a hierarchical auction a hierarchical reduced form, and let QAI ..AK denote the reduced form of qA-Ak* Let t denote the set of all reduced forms of symmetric auctions.
STATEMENT OF RESULTS
The following propositions characterizing 9 generalize the partial results of Maskin and Riley (1984, Theorem 7) and Matthews (1984 In this case, a symmetric auction is defined by the four numbers q(1, 1), q(1, 2), q(2, 1), and q(2, 2), where q(i, j) is the probability that bidder 1 wins when his type is i and bidder 2's type is j. The symmetry conditions imply that q(1, 1) < 1, q(2,2) < 1, and q(1, 2) + q(2, 1) < 1. That is, the set :j of symmetric auctions can be viewed as the set In that case, the axes must be scaled by the probability of each type in order for the slopes to be correct.) This example suggests that by embedding 9 in an appropriate vector space, for which indicator functions define linear functionals, then Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 become statements about the hyperplanes bounding 9. This is indeed the case when `9 is embedded in Loo(A).
PROOFS
We break the proof down into easily digestible lemmas. The first lemma states that the probability that a bidder from set A wins, NJAQdA, does not exceed the probability that there exists a bidder from A, 1 -A(AC)N.
Let Kf, g) denote fIf(t)g(t)
dA ( To complete the proof of Proposition 3.1, we must show that if Q X ', then it is separated from -by a simple function. This will be accomplished using a separating hyperplane argument, after establishing some topological preliminaries. The set ` of implementable functions is clearly convex. We want to embed it as a compact set in an appropriate linear space whose dual contains the simple functions as a dense set. Matthews (1984) 13) and (5.15), qk(tl, ... . tN) = Q(tk) 1 1 and for i # k, qi(t1, ..., tN) 
This shows that the modified auction q is feasible, and the proof is finally complete.
Q.E.D.
We prove Proposition 3.2 for simple functions in the next lemma. Then a limiting argument proves the general case. Define q to be the auction generated by the hierarchy E1E2. That is, 
